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While thinking philosophically we see problems in places 
where there are none. (PG 47) 
 
The primacy of the deed 
If I had to say what the single, most important contribution Wittgenstein made to philosophy 
was, it would be to have revived the animal in us; the animal that is there in every fibre of 
our human being, and therefore also in our thinking and reasoning. This means, his pushing 
us to realize that we are animals not only genealogically, but as evolved human beings – 
whether neonate, or language-possessing, civilized, law-abiding, fully-fledged adults. 
Constitutionally, and in everything we do, still fundamentally animals.  
 Wittgenstein's evocation of the 'animal' in us is strewn, more or less implicitly, 
throughout his philosophy, but it is clearly articulated in On Certainty, where he says he wants 
to conceive of our basic certainty 'as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; 
as it were, as something animal' (OC 359). By this he means: as something instinctive, thought-
free, reflex-like. And this animal state is applied to us also in our acquisition of language:  
 
     I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which 
one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive 
state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication 
needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of 
ratiocination. (OC 475) 
 
As also in our grasping of the world's 'furniture':  
     
 Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs, exist, etc., etc., – 
they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc., etc.  
     Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. “Is 
there such a thing as a unicorn?” and so on. But such a question is 
possible only because as a rule no corresponding question presents 
itself. For how does one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the 
existence of unicorns? How did one learn the method for determining 
whether something exists or not? (OC 476; my emphasis) 
 
One does not learn a method of figuring out whether something exists or not until a question 
presents itself. And a question does not normally present itself as to whether I or the chair I 
am sitting in exist. It does normally present itself about unicorns, or about whether there are 
chairs in the next room. What Wittgenstein is doing here is deproblematizing or de-
intellectualizing what we have problematized and intellectualized. There is no question or 
problem about existence until there is a question or a problem about it: 
 
     'So one must know that the objects whose names one teaches a child 
by ostensive definition exists.'— Why must one know they do? Isn’t it 
enough that experience doesn’t later show the opposite? 
2 
         5158 words 
     For why should the language-game rest on some kind of knowledge? 
(OC 477) 
 
     Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk 
exists? Does a cat know that a mouse exists? (OC 478) 
 
If a cat doesn't need to know that a mouse exists before chasing it, nor does a child need to 
know that milk exists before drinking it. And nor does an adult need to know that a house 
exists before entering it. For Wittgenstein, grasping the world is by default done primitively – 
not epistemically, or indeed propositionally. Here, perception – be it of the milk, the mouse 
or the house – is, as Dan Hutto puts it, 'not contentful but enabling' (Forthcoming). And 
contrary to 'the widely-endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves 
content' (Hutto & Myin 2013), Wittgenstein regards cognition as always and everywhere 
involving man as an animal, as a creature in a primitive state. He insists that we cannot make 
a move or have a thought that does not stem from the animal in us; and that it is only after 
that primitive start that cognition can have content.   
 This translates into saying that, for Wittgenstein, 'at the beginning is the deed', not the 
word, not the proposition, but the deed, action: 'Language – I want to say – is a refinement. 
"In the beginning was the deed."' (CE 395; CV 31). And 'the beginning' here – as also the 
term 'primitive' whenever used by Wittgenstein or myself in this paper – is not to be 
understood only ontogenetically and phylogenetically, but also logically
1
. This is where 
'enactivism' comes in. Action, in Wittgenstein, is everywhere – not only at the origin of 
thought and language for the human species and for all individual human beings, but at the 
origin of any human thought or utterance. That is, it has regained its rightful place in the 
description of our human mindedness; a place usurped by an inflated intellect and brain, in 
the form of content, propositions, representations, engrams2 or intelligent neurons. Action – 
and not any of these – is, for Wittgenstein, at the logical foundation of thought. This is not 
merely to say that we need to be alive to think – or that thinking is a form of acting – but that 
much – not all, but much – of what we have always regarded as thinking is in fact acting or 
behaviour. Acting, however, that looks like thought because we – philosophers – have put it 
into words. This includes such things as our basic beliefs, spontaneous utterances
3
, and rules 
of grammar. Now of course, all of these can be put into sentences or, if you like, 
propositions, but what Wittgenstein has shown is that they do not stem from propositions; 
and so they do not start out as any kind of content.  
 So, two things I'd like to do here: one is to briefly survey two of the 'topics' that 
Wittgenstein has 'enactivized', as it were; the other is to stress that this enactivism is not 
                                                 
1
 Lars Hertzberg (1992) distinguishes two senses in Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of ‘primitive’: a logical 
sense, indicating the place occupied by a type of reaction or utterance in relation to a language-game; and an 
anthropological sense, connected with understanding the place of a reaction in the life of a human being. I 
would add: in the history of the human species – and so: primitive in the phylogenetic sense as well. It is of 
course the logical that is of philosophical interest, but Wittgenstein’s method of philosophizing ‘by example’, 
appeals to anthropological cases in point. 'But what is the word "primitive" meant to say here? Presumably that 
this sort of behaviour is pre-linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of 
thinking and not the result of thought.' (Z 541) 
2
 An engram is 'the transient or enduring change in our brain that results from encoding an experience’ (Shacter 
1996, 58; my emphasis). 
3
 See Moyal-Sharrock (2000). 
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anything added but rather what is left when our superfluous, unsubstantiated, explanation-
hungry enhancements have been erased from the straight-forward picture of human action 
and cognition. The two topics I will look at are: basic beliefs and memory, thereby hoping to 
give an idea of how Wittgenstein's Razor
4
 has pared off some of the excess in epistemology 
and philosophy of mind. 
 But before I do this, I'd like to briefly enumerate a few of the other ways in which 
Wittgenstein helped emphasize the primacy of action, together with the superfluity – in basic 
or primitive cases – of propositions and cognition, in his account of mind, language and 
action. We can start with his signature phrase: 'meaning is use'; meaning is the product of our 
operating with words (AWL 21); and so: 'The meaning of a word is described by describing 
its use' (AWL 48) – that is, how we operate with that word. And so it goes for 
understanding. As Wittgenstein says:  
      
We think there must be something going on in one's mind for one to 
understand the word 'plant'. We are inclined to say that what we mean 
by one's understanding the word is a process in the mind. ... There is a 
way out of the difficulty of explaining what understanding is if we take 
'understanding a word' to mean, roughly, being able to use it. The point 
of this explanation is to replace 'understanding a word' by 'being able to 
use a word', which is not so easily thought of as denoting an [inner] 
activity. (AWL 78) 
      
In most cases it [the word 'understand'] is used to mean being able to do 
so-and-so. When a man understands an order it is true that often certain 
pictures are present to his mind, though often not. (AWL 80) 
 
Add to this his view of rule-following in terms of making a move rather than a judgment. To 
follow a rule is to do something; calculating, using mathematical rules, are mechanical 
activities; like making moves that one was trained to perform
5
. Rules of mathematics are akin 
to orders or commands (RFM VII 40; V 13) that impart technique (RFM VII 1) – 'The 
mathematical proposition says to me: 'Proceed like this!' (RFM VII 73); it 'determines ... lays 
down a path for us' (RFM IV 8). 'The expressions 'being able to', 'understanding how to', 
'knowing how to go on' […] have practically the same grammars' (AWL 92; my emphasis).  
 Wittgenstein's razor is seen at work on the subjects of perception, belief, feelings, 
sensations, emotions and of course action, wherever we have traditionally inserted an 
intellectual process or state – be it a thought, a description, an interpretation, an inference, a 
                                                 
4
 Of course, Wittgenstein's Razor is not exactly Occam's, but the underlying idea is the same: using parsimony, 
simplicity, and making the fewest assumptions in our descriptions (Occam would probably say 'explanations'); 
preferring 'the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences' (TLP 6.363). 
5
'Might we not do arithmetic without having the idea of uttering arithmetical propositions, and without ever 
having been struck by the similarity between a multiplication and a proposition? / Should we not shake our 
heads, though, when someone shewed us a multiplication done wrong, as we do when someone tells us it is 
raining, if it is not raining? – Yes; and here is a point of connection. But we also make gestures to stop our dog, 
e.g. when he behaves as we do not wish. / We are used to saying "2 times 2 is 4", and the verb "is" makes this 
into a proposition, and apparently establishes a close kinship with everything that we call a 'proposition'. 
Whereas it is a matter only of a very superficial relationship.' (RFM III 4). See also RFM I 143-4 and the 
thought experiment at IV 15-20 and V 8. 
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judgment, or a justified true belief – that turns out, upon scrutiny, to be superfluous. Here are 
some examples: 
 
The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores 
next winter as well. And no more do we need a law of induction to 
justify our actions or our predictions. (OC 287) 
 
You don't need any knowledge to find a smell repulsive. (LWI 758) 
 
It is not as if he had only indirect, while I have internal direct evidence 
for my mental state. Rather, he has evidence for it, (but) I do not. (LW II, 
p. 67) 
 
Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me 
up or contradicts me. For to say one knows one has a pain means 
nothing. (OC 504) 
 
If I let my gaze wander round a room and suddenly it lights on an object 
of a striking red colour, and I say “Red!” – that is not a description. (PI 
p. 187) 
 
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the 
opinion that he has a soul. (PI 287) 
 
... we can see from their actions that [people] believe certain things ... 
(OC 284; my emphasis) 
 
And Wittgenstein has drawn our attention to the enacted nature of spontaneous first-person 
psychological utterances, showing that, here too, 'words are deeds' – adding a new twist to 
the notion of speech-acts
6
: 
 
The words "I am happy" are a bit of the behaviour of joy. (RPP I, 450) 
 
The exclamation "I'm longing to see him!" may be called an act of 
expecting. But I can utter the same words as the result of self-
observation. (PI 586) 
 
Are the words "I am afraid" a description of a state of mind? It depends 
on the game they are in. [PI, p. 187] 
 
Also, for Wittgenstein, meaning, language-acquisition and concept-formation are 
rooted in instinctive reactions and gestures
7
 and further developed through training and 
enculturation
8
. The field of language acquisition – Michael Tomasello's work particularly 
                                                 
6
 See Moyal-Sharrock (2000). 
7
 '"Meaning" ("Bedeutung") comes from "point" ("deuten"). What we call meaning must be connected with the 
primitive language of gestures (pointing-language).' (BT 24); 'The origin and the primitive form of the language 
game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language – I want to say – is a 
refinement. "In the beginning was the deed."' (CE 395 – CV p. 31); 'Being sure that someone is in pain, 
doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive kinds of behaviour towards other human 
beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is 
an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct).' (Z 545) [cf. RPP I, 151]. 
8
 On the latter, see José Medina's excellent The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. 
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attests to this – is starting to be infiltrated by Wittgenstein. And I have myself tried to show 
how Wittgenstein's work helps destabilize the picture of an innate mental grammar with a 
grammar that is rooted in our primitive reactions and transmitted socio-culturally
9
. Meaning, 
believing, thinking, understanding, reasoning, calculating, learning, following rules, 
remembering, intending, expecting, longing – there is hardly anything, traditionally thought 
to be emergent from, underwritten by, or reducible to, a mental process or state, that 
Wittgenstein has not subjected to the razor of enactivism; that is: shown to be primitively 
embodied or enacted rather than originating in propositions, theories of mind, or ghostly 
processes. 
 This may sound like behaviourism, but it isn't. As Peter Hacker aptly sums up:  
 
... behaviourism was right about some matters. Logical behaviourism 
(e.g., Carnap and Feigl in the 1930s) was right to insist that there is an 
internal relation between mental attributes and behaviour. For the criteria 
for ascribing mental attributes to others consist in their behaviour in the 
circumstances of life. Where it was wrong was to suppose that the 
mental is reducible to behaviour and dispositions to behave. Ontological 
behaviourism (Watson and Skinner) was right to emphasise that 
language learning is based on training, and that it presupposes common 
behavioural reactions and responses. It was right to conceive of language 
learning as learning new forms of behaviour – learning how to do things 
with words. It was correct to conceive of understanding in terms of 
abilities and dispositions, rather than as a hidden mental state or process. 
But the behaviourists were sorely mistaken to suppose that the mental is 
a fiction. One can think and feel without showing it, and one can exhibit 
thoughts and feelings without having them. Avowals of experience are 
indeed a form of behaviour, but what they avow is not behaviour. 
(Forthcoming) 
   
So, not behaviourism, but enactivism. I remember my first paper at Kirchberg in 1997 
– before I'd ever heard the term 'enactivism' – was entitled 'The enacted nature of basic 
beliefs' and I was taken to task by my audience for using the word 'enacted' as implying that 
there was something there, preceding the enactment, that was going to be enacted. So I 
dropped the word, and went on talking about 'certainty in action' and 'logic in action'. But I 
shouldn't have been so quickly discouraged. The word needn't be, and indeed hasn't been, 
thus understood. Wittgenstein is an enactivist through and through. Indeed, perhaps the first 
enactivist, though a bid can also be made there by Aristotle
10
. But let me now turn to 
Wittgenstein and basic beliefs
11
. 
 
                                                 
9
 See Moyal-Sharrock (2010). 
10
 For Aristotle, the soul (psuchē) is a set of capacities (or functions), and mind (nous) is one of them. But unlike 
all the other capacities or faculties (e.g. sight, smell), the mind has no corresponding bodily organ; e.g. the brain. 
This, however, does not mean that Aristotle thinks the mind is not 'embodied' – that we could think, hope, 
expect, desire, will etc. without having a body, or that the body plays no role in our thinking, hoping, etc. – on 
the contrary, he claims there is no separating the mind from the body. This is his hylomorphism. Aristotle is then 
the first philosopher to envisage, and indeed, champion the idea of embodied mind.  
11
 I can, in this brief summary, only hope to gesture at Wittgenstein's treatment of basic beliefs. For a more 
comprehensive analysis, see Moyal-Sharrock (2007); for a summary account, see Moyal-Sharrock 
(Forthcoming). 
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An enacted certainty 
I want to say: it’s not that on some points men know the truth 
with perfect certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter 
of their attitude. (OC 404) 
 
On Certainty is Wittgenstein's attempt – prompted by G. E. Moore's problematic conclusion 
in 'Proof of an External World' (1939) – to uncover the nature of our basic beliefs. As he 
ponders that nature, we see Wittgenstein consider various possibilities: he thinks of these 
basic beliefs in propositional terms and in pictorial terms
12
, but his ultimate depiction of our 
basic beliefs is as ways of acting (OC 204). Let's briefly see how he gets there. 
 Recall Moore's shortlist of 'truisms' of which he says 'I know, with certainty to be 
true': 
 
There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was 
born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since …. 
Among the things which have… formed part of its environment ... have… been 
large numbers of other living human bodies ... the earth had existed also for many 
years before my body was born… (1925, 33-34) 
  
'Here is a hand', and so on. Wittgenstein considers these 'truisms' and others in On Certainty, 
such as: 'if someone’s arm is cut off it will not grow again', (OC 274); 'cats don't grow on 
trees' (OC 282); 'I am sitting [here]' (OC 195). There are, he says, countless such general 
empirical propositions that count as certain for us (OC 273). He realizes, however, that our 
certainty vis-à-vis these apparent empirical propositions – their standing fast for us; our not 
doubting them – is not due to reasoning or verification, to our having empirically or 
rationally exhausted all avenues of doubt on their behalf, but to our not treating or regarding 
them as susceptible of doubt in the first place. Our basic certainty is not of the order of 
justification or reflection
13
, or indeed of truth
14
, and it is therefore not susceptible of mistake, 
doubt, or falsification – for where no epistemic route was followed, no epistemic fault is 
possible: 'I know how to ascertain that I have two coins in my pocket. But I cannot ascertain 
that I have two hands, because I cannot doubt it' (LWI, 832). To be certain, here, means to be 
unwaveringly and yet noncognitively poised on something that enables us to think, speak or 
act meaningfully. That something is grammar. 
Wittgenstein comes to realize that Moore's truisms, though they resemble or have the 
form of, empirical or epistemic propositions are in fact expressions of bounds of sense or 
rules of grammar – at par with '2+2=4': 
 
I want to say: The physical game is just as certain as the arithmetical. … 
If one doesn't marvel at the fact that the propositions of arithmetic (e.g. 
the multiplication tables) are 'absolutely certain', then why should one be 
                                                 
12
 Wittgenstein speaks of our basic beliefs as forming a World-picture – or Weltbild (OC 167). 
13
 OC 34, 103, 94, 105, 253, 58-59. 
14
 'But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.' 
(OC 94); 'I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and 
asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing' (OC 162); 'If the true is what is 
grounded, then the ground is not true nor yet false' (OC 205).  
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astonished that the proposition 'This is my hand' is so equally? (OC 447-
8)
15
 
 
And precisely because these truisms are not justified true beliefs, he rebukes Moore for 
claiming that he knows them:  
 
I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but 
it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is 
part of our method of doubt and inquiry. (OC 151) 
   
Which is to say – for Wittgenstein – part of our grammar. Moore's truisms, then, express not 
objects of knowledge, but bounds of sense; that which enables us to get to knowledge. In a 
well-known metaphor, Wittgenstein uses the image of hinges that must stand fast in order for 
the door of enquiry to turn (OC 341; 343).  
 Now some of these bounds of sense or rules of grammar (e.g. 'This is (what we call) a 
table' or 'People sometimes lie') are acquired, yet – like all rules – they are acquired not 
empirically or epistemically
16
 but through training
17
 or repeated exposure. Others are 'there 
like our life' (OC 559); they are a natural, animal-like or instinctual certainty that need never 
be taught or even articulated – e.g. 'Humans have bodies', 'There exist people other than 
myself'. Here, to be certain does not imply that one can understand the sentences just written 
out. A one-year old child not yet in possession of language shows that she is endowed with 
such certainties by reaching out for her mother, interacting with others, etc.  
 Yet whatever their origin – whether they be natural or 'second-nature' certainties – all 
hinges function as grammatical rules
18
; they 'form the foundation of all operating with 
thoughts' (OC 401). Wittgenstein, however, warns us against thinking of this grammar in 
propositional terms:  
 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; -- but the end is 
not certain 'propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204) 
 
                                                 
15
 See also: 'When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions 
which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system 
of our empirical propositions' (OC 136; my emphasis). 
16
 Of course, some certainties may have started out as empirical or epistemic observations, but then underwent 
nonratiocinative assimilation. For more on this, see Moyal-Sharrock (2007). 
17
 Wittgenstein even speaks of taming (Abrichten); cf. PI 5; and in the Blue Book: 'I am using the word "trained" 
in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things. It is done by 
means of example, reward, punishment, and suchlike' (BB 77). 
18
 This highlights the various manifestations of what Wittgenstein calls 'grammar': it is not always verbalised or 
explicitly taught; it is often grasped unawares – and of course, used unawares; nor does it only regulate the use 
of specific words, but also more generally denotes the conditions of thought: 'the conditions necessary for the 
understanding (of the sense)' (PG p. 88). The hinge: 'There exist people other than myself' is an artificial 
expression of one of the grammatical conditions necessary for the use and understanding of the sense of such 
descriptive or informative statements as: 'The world's population doubled between 1950 and 1990'. In the same 
way that our speaking about a rod (e.g. 'Cut this rod in half!') is conditioned by the grammatical rule: 'A rod has 
a length'. And neither of these rules need ever have been explicitly formulated to be operative: 'The propositions 
describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; 
and the game can be played purely practically, without learning any explicit rules' (OC 95). 
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Grammar is seen as belonging to the realm of acting
19
.  
Hinge or basic certainty is not a matter of propositions or intellection at all, but takes 
the form of spontaneous acting in the certainty of… an innumerable array of things. It is 
much like an unselfconscious know-how:  
 
My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and 
so on. – I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc. (OC 7; 
my emphasis) 
 
Although I have never uttered or thought the words 'Chairs are for sitting on' or 'Doors can be 
opened and closed', what I say about, and do with, chairs and doors shows that I have 
grasped these conceptual features – though the certainty of my grasp is not a conceptual or 
propositional one. Rather:  
 
It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without 
having doubts. (OC 510) 
And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing. (OC 511) 
 
This sureness which, unlike a knowing, does not originate in doubt or hesitation and which 
has the characteristics of a reflex action, of an automatism, of an instinct, is then foreign to 
thought. And this thoughtlessness – that which lays the basis for thought (OC 411), and is 
therefore itself not (a) thought – is also a wordlessness; it goes without saying: 
 
I believe that I had great-grandparents, that the people who gave themselves out as my 
parents really were my parents, etc. This belief may never have been expressed; even the 
thought that it was so, never thought. (OC 159) 
 
An ineffable certainty: it goes without saying 
Such is the enacted nature of grammar and basic beliefs that they do not even, as such, bear 
saying within the stream of the language-game but only in heuristic situations: that is, in 
situations where rules of grammar are transmitted (through drill or training) to a child, a 
disturbed adult or a foreign speaker; or in philosophical discussion. To articulate grammatical 
rules within the stream of the language-game – that is, non-heuristically – is to articulate 
bounds of sense as if they were informative statements. If a forester were to say to his men: 
'This tree has got to be cut down, and this one and this one', that would be an informative 
statement. If he were then to say, pointing to a perfectly ordinary tree: 'That is a tree', his men 
would look at him askance. The language-game is suddenly frozen; the forester isn't making 
sense: he seems to want to inform his men of something so basic they would have learned it 
as children. As Wittgenstein writes, the only way 'the information "That is a tree", when no 
one could doubt it' might have meaning is as 'a kind of joke' (OC 463). The forester's 
certainty that that is a tree can only show itself in his normal dealing with the tree; it cannot 
                                                 
19
 The reform of logical necessity from its traditional depiction as an inexorable law to an inexorable attitude in 
the face of what it makes sense to say or think about certain things was undertaken by Wittgenstein in the 
Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics – an attitude of inexorable application in the Remarks (p. 82), this 
attitude is glossed in On Certainty as one of nonratiocinated, immediate trust (cf. OC 150, 283, 509) and 
thoughtless grasp (OC 511).  
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qua certainty be meaningfully said. That that is a tree is the ineffable
20
 hinge on which turns 
his singling out the targeted trees. The hinge is 'fixed and … removed from the traffic' (OC 
210) – that is, it enables, but does not belong to the language-game. To say a hinge in the 
flow of the language-game invariably arrests the game; the fluidity of the game depends on 
its hinges remaining invisible (unsaid): all the forester needs to say for his men to get to work 
is which trees need cutting.  
Hinge certainty is an enacted certainty, exhibiting itself in the smoothness of our 
normal, basic operating in the world. Moore's saying "I know that 'here is a hand'" conveyed 
no certainty that was not already visible in his speaking about his hand, in his raising it, or 
simply in his unselfconsciously using it. Our hinge certainty that 'That is a tree' shows itself 
in our treating it as something to cut for firewood, or to sit under for shade, or to examine for 
its classification. Hinges are grammatical rules, but they are rules in action; logic in action: 
'That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in 
deed not doubted' (OC 342). It is our deeds that show we do not, cannot, doubt some things if 
we are to make sense. And if we were in deed to doubt, it would not be a manifestation of 
uncertainty, but of nonsense or madness. Our foundational certainty is operative only in 
action, not in words
21
.  
 Wittgenstein's conclusion in On Certainty is that our basic certainty is logical, 
logically ineffable, and enacted. I have elsewhere called this a logical pragmatism
22
. As he'd 
already suspected in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 'The limits of 
empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively known to be correct; they are 
ways in which … we act' (RFM VII, 21). 
 
An enacted foundationalism 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, 
and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is 
simply what I do.' (PI 217) 
 
With On Certainty foundationalism sheds its old skin. Where epistemologists have always 
thought of our basic beliefs as propositions, Wittgenstein sees them as rules of grammar or 
bounds of sense that manifest themselves as ways of acting. These rules can be articulated 
into sentences, as I've been doing, but such articulation is effected only for heuristic 
purposes. The problem is that, once verbalised, these rules of grammar misleadingly look like 
empirical propositions, conclusions that we come to from experience. This resemblance has 
                                                 
20
 Ineffable or, as Guetti and Read have it, invisible: 'Grammatically, a rule in action is "invisible" just in virtue 
of the fact that, to be taken as a rule – to be an actionable or capacitative concept – it must be un-expressed and 
un-exposed.' (1996, 52).  
21
 Though of course the certainty shows itself as much in what we say (e.g., 'I've got to wash my hands') as in 
what we do (cf. OC 431). To stress the ineffability of hinges is not merely to point out the superfluity of saying 
what (in normal circumstances) is already certain and whose articulation would be idle repetition, it is to 
underline the logical unsayability of hinges. A hinge cannot be meaningfully articulated other than in a heuristic 
situation – that is, as a grammatical rule. Only in such contexts, is it plainly not offered as a hypothesis, but 
pointed at as a rule, an enabler. It must be noted, however, that sentences identical to hinges but that do not 
function as hinges – what I have elsewhere called nongrammatical doppelgänger of hinges – can be 
meaningfully articulated within the stream of the language-game. The doppelgänger of a hinge is a sentence 
made up of the same words as a hinge, but which does not function as a hinge. 
22
 See Moyal-Sharrock (2003). 
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confused philosophers, and disconcerts Wittgenstein himself throughout much of On 
Certainty. But he comes to see that we have, yet again, been mystified by the appearance of 
language
23
: 'I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical 
proposition is one' (OC 308). Wittgenstein realises that our basic certainties are, indeed, not 
propositions but animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated, look like 
propositional beliefs. It is this misleading appearance that leads philosophers to believe that 
at the foundation of thought is yet more thought. This insight enables him to solve the 
problem that occupied Moore and plagues epistemology – that of the foundation of 
knowledge. What philosophers have traditionally called 'basic beliefs' cannot, on pain of 
infinite regress, be themselves further propositional beliefs, and Wittgenstein’s conception of 
hinge certainty shows they aren't. 
 Having, in the Investigations, put the animal back in language24, Wittgenstein allows 
the animal to surface in epistemology, making clear for philosophy at large, and not only 
epistemology, that thought is prefaced by thoughtlessness that has been interpreted as 
thought; by spontaneity, automatism, rule, reflex and instinct. In resisting the temptation to 
underpin knowledge with yet more knowledge, he shows that we do not start with judgments 
or propositions, but with animal actions and reactions that evolve into content-laden thought 
and action. We do not go from proposition to deed, but vice-versa: from a non-reflective 
grasp to a sophisticated one; from doing to judging and thinking. It would seem, then, that it 
is our ambition to explain, to gain firmness and hold on a phenomenon, that leads us to turn 
ways of acting into 'tacit beliefs' and 'basic propositions'.  
In our standard pictures of memory, Wittgenstein discerns yet another instance of our 
need to solidify, fix, incarnate or reify what deploys itself in our ways of acting.  
 
Memory is not in the brain 
As regards memory, Wittgenstein debunks our preconceptions about it residing in the brain –  
in storage as it were – in the form of encoded traces (or engrams). He starts off grazing away 
at our preconceptions by suggesting that it is not a necessary law – a logical one – that 
remembering be caused by anything physiological: 
 
     I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I 
remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this 
remembering in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it 
may be, be stored-up there in any form? Why must a trace have been left 
behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no 
physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts of causality 
then it is high time they were upset. [Z 608] (RPP I, 905) 
 
 That this is a mere 'logical' reminder – one to shake us out of our physicalist 
complacency
25
 – is confirmed by the fact that it comes after Wittgenstein's assumption, a 
                                                 
23
 'We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all of our everyday language-games because the 
outward forms of our language make everything alike.' [Cf. PI p. 224] (LWI, 909) 
24
 Cavell: 'Wittgenstein's motive … is to put the human animal back into language and therewith back into 
philosophy' (1979, 207). 
25
 'Nothing is more important in explanations of thought and brain processes than throwing away all the old 
prejudices about causality. This seems to me by far the most important step' (MS 134, 104-5, originally 
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couple of passages earlier, that there exists a correlation between such activities as talking or 
writing and what goes on in the brain: 'if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of 
impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts' (RPP I, 
903). This, however, is ensconced in a passage where he also seems to reject correlation. So 
what exactly is Wittgenstein is rejecting? Let's have a closer look: 
 
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in 
the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be 
impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean 
this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out 
from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. (RPP 
I, 903) 
 
The kind of correlation Wittgenstein is rejecting is one which would putatively allow one to 
read off thought-processes from brain processes – that is, a representational or encrypted 
(codified) correlation. But he endorses the other kind of correlation, the nonrepresentational, 
non-encrypted kind – the merely physiological correlation. Having done this, he adds that we 
should not look for anything more in those physical impulses; there is no deeper correlation 
or 'system' or further 'order' in those impulses that would, say, represent the content of our 
thoughts: 
 
But why should the system continue further in the direction of the 
centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? 
(RPP I, 903) 
   
This last sentence seems outlandish; yet not if 'chaos' is understood merely as the 
negation of 'order'. All Wittgenstein is saying here is that nothing warrants our looking for a 
further order or narrower correlation – that is, an isomorphic one – between a brain impulse 
and a thought. A certain kind of brain impulse may be correlated to thinking (rather than, say, 
to feeling pain), but not to a particular thought or other (so that by reproducing the impulse, 
we would reproduce the particular thought). Elsewhere, he writes: 
 
… nothing seems more possible to me than that people someday will come to 
the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the 
nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, 
or memory. (LW I 504).  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
appearing between RPP I, 906 and 908). In the Brown Book already, Wittgenstein had deplored our being in the 
grip of the physicalist picture of memory and causality: 'we can hardly help conceiving of memory as a kind of 
storehouse. Note also how sure people are that to the ability to add or to multiply or to say a poem by heart, etc., 
there must correspond a peculiar state of the person's brain, although on the other hand they know next to 
nothing about such psycho-physiological correspondences. We regard these phenomena as manifestations of 
this mechanism, and their possibility is the particular construction of the mechanism itself.' (BB 118). Although 
Wittgenstein means RPP I, 905 to be a mere logical reminder, may not the question it contains: 'Why should 
there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds?' – which echoes this 
from the previous passage: it is 'perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated 
physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to them' (RPP I, 904) – be, in some sense, 
empirically plausible? Think of cases such as someone's excessive ambition causing their loneliness; or greed 
causing someone to become corrupt, where no physiological trace or connection or mediation or causation 
obtains, though many psychological or intentional connections do. 
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Just as a certain kind of seed will engender only a certain kind of plant, some 
impulses may enable only thoughts – and may be identified as thought-enabling impulses – 
but just as the seed does not contain, even in encoded form, the individual plant that will 
grow from it, nor does a brain impulse contain or carry the thought it enables, or even 
something that corresponds to that thought. There is nothing that physiologically 
corresponds to our thoughts, which does not mean that our thoughts are not dependent on 
physiological structures and processes.  
So that what Wittgenstein unambiguously rejects is not a psychophysical correlation, 
but a psychophysical parallelism; that is, an isomorphic correlation between brain processes 
and thoughts or memories:  
 
Even if we knew that a particular area of the brain is changed by hearing God 
Save the King and that destroying this part of the brain prevents one's 
remembering the occasion, there is no reason to think that the structure 
produced in the brain represents God Save the King better than Rule Brittania. 
(LPP 90) 
 
The brain is a mechanical enabler; it is not ipso facto the storehouse and codifier of 
our memories:  
 
     An event leaves a trace in the memory: one sometimes imagines this as if it 
consisted in the event's having left a trace, an impression, a consequence, in the 
nervous system. As if one could say: even the nerves have a memory. But then 
when someone remembered an event, he would have to infer it from this 
impression, this trace. Whatever the event does leave behind in the organism, it 
isn't the memory. (RPP I, 220) 
 
As Stéphane Chauvier notes: 'That a lesion in a part of her brain prevents an individual from 
recognizing certain familiar faces informs us about the neural conditions required for 
someone to recognize a face, but the recognition of a face is not itself a neuronal process' 
(2007, 46). Recognizing is not a neuronal process, though a neuronal process enables 
recognizing. Here is how Bennett and Hacker put it with respect to remembering: 
 
     It may well be the case that but for certain neural configurations or strengths 
of synaptic connections, one would not be able to remember the date of the 
Battle of Hastings and would not recollect being told it. But it does not follow 
from that idea that what one remembers must be, as it were, written down in the 
brain, or that there must be some neural configuration in the brain from which 
one could in principle read off what is remembered. Nor can it be said that this 
neural configuration is a memory. ... The expression of a memory must be 
distinguished from the neural configurations, whatever they may be, which are 
conditions for a person's recollecting whatever he recollects. But these 
configurations are not the memory; nor are they representations, depictions or 
expressions of what is remembered. (2003, 170-1; my emphasis) 
 
 Not only do we conflate causal conditions with causal representations, and 
mistakenly take the brain to be recording what we see in an isomorphic trace, we also see this 
trace as having an activating function: it acts as mediator and activator between the original 
event and our ability to call it to mind. So that every time we remember an event, besides 
representing it, the trace is also supposed to select, decode and activate the memory. But this 
amounts to attributing intentionality (i.e. conscious selection, decision, rejection) to an 
13 
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unconscious process. Nothing has been gained, since we find ourselves with an unconscious 
made up of the same elements as a conscious subject; and what we had invoked to explain 
conscious memory now itself requires an explanation (Dalla Barba 2000, 146-7). To accept 
the hypothesis of unconscious monitoring mechanisms is to fall prey to the homunculus 
fallacy. Memory cannot rely on such things as mental representations or memory engrams 
because there is no homunculus there to interpret them and to provide memory traces with 
their past tense. Neuronal changes in the brain may be necessary, but they are not sufficient 
for memory; and they are not codified memory
26
.  
 Wittgenstein further counters the pervasive conception of memory as storage and 
retrieval by insisting that there is no one conception, picture or metaphor that will render the 
multifarious ways in which we remember something: 
 
… it is not one particular state of mind that is involved in […] remembering' 
[…] What happens when I remember my toothache? Perhaps what happens is 
only that I say I remember it, though there is usually some sort of 
accompaniment.  
     Different sorts of memories are to be distinguished. One kind passes in time, 
cinematographically. Another is like an image given all at once, but afar off. 
And we must not fail to take account of the kind of memory which consists in 
remembering a poem or tune rather than some event of the past. In these cases 
'to remember it' means 'to be able to reproduce it'. (AWL 56) 
 
Memory as a way of acting 
Whereas we are inclined to believe that saying or doing something cannot be all there is to 
memory; that it leaves out the essential feature of the mental process of memory and gives us 
only an accessory feature (cf. BB 86), Wittgenstein unprecedently affirms that words, as well 
as gestures, can constitute remembering – they don't always, but they can. Remembering can 
amount to 'doing something' such as reciting a poem by heart or fetching someone's key for 
them; recognizing someone can consist in saying 'Hello!' to them in words, gestures, facial 
expressions, etc. (BB 165-6). He writes: 
 
Remembering, then, isn't at all the mental process that one imagines at first 
sight. If I say, rightly, 'I remember it,' the most varied things may happen; 
perhaps even just that I say it. (PG 42) 
  
If someone remembers his hope, on the whole he is not therefore remembering 
his behaviour, nor even necessarily his thoughts. He says ... that at that time he 
hoped. (RPP I, 468) 
 
 These hardly resemble mental consultations of mental archives. Wittgenstein is not, 
however, suggesting that there can be no mental process of remembering. If you ask me 
when the last time was I had chocolate fondue, I'd have to stop and think about it, and so 
there would be a mental process of remembering. Nothing mysterious here; I would be doing 
                                                 
26
  Colin Allen remarks (in personal communication) that 'we want to say more than that neuronal 
configurations are required for memory – a supply of oxygen is also required, but different neuronal 
configurations support different capacities for remembering specific events or items, which is not true of 
oxygen supply'. I would question that remembering specific events or items requires specific neuronal 
configurations, and would in any case reply that the fact that more specialized requirements must be met for 
remembering to occur does not entail that one of those requirements be representation.  
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the remembering, the deliberate calling to mind of certain moments in my past. What 
Wittgenstein rejects is only that 'peculiar' mental state or process which is thought to 
necessarily occur along with or in advance of the expressions (utterances, gestures etc.) of 
memory. On Wittgenstein's view, we are warranted in speaking of a memory act if by it we 
do not mean a ghostly, amorphous mental event that must precede and cause an expression or 
act of recall: 
 
In remembering a poem we do not first [subconsciously] visualize the printed 
poem and then say it. We simply start off by saying it ... (AWL 56) 
 
What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of 
the use of the word 'to remember'. (PI 305) 
 
 Wittgenstein's major contribution to the elucidation of the concept of memory is his 
discrediting the picture of memory as information storage and replacing it with the idea that 
memory is nothing but an ability (which, of course, is – as are all our abilities – 
physiologically supported by the brain) and that, in some contexts, remembering amounts to 
a way of acting; that is to an act or expression which does not result from introspection or 
retrospection (e.g. BB 85).  
 Wittgenstein gives various examples of remembering as prompted by or embedded in 
certain acts: 'I draw a curve on paper when the man speaks; when I trace the curve again I 
can repeat the sentence; but the curve can't be read as a code' (LPP 90). Although retracing 
the curve is here a necessary condition for recall, Wittgenstein insists that it is not any 
representative nature the curve would have acquired that makes it thus necessary – 'the curve 
can't be read as a code'. Nor would Wittgenstein have agreed with extended mind theorists 
that such examples of situated and embodied memory are mere cognitive scaffolding, or that 
they are 'best seen as alien but complementary to the brain's style of storage and 
computation', as does Andy Clark (1997, 220; original emphasis). For Wittgenstein, retracing 
the curve is, along with being a minimally healthy human being, a sufficient condition for 
recall. In a similar passage, he adds: these jottings would 'not be a rendering of the text, not a 
translation, so to speak, in another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the 
jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous system?' (RPP I, 908). 
 
The way forward  
Wittgenstein then helps us move away from the distorted picture of memory as the storage 
and retrieval of reified 'memories' towards a conception of memory as something that can be 
situated, contextualized, external and in action. My remembering something can be in the 
form of a mental picture, but it can also have the form of a gesture or a sentence. 
Remembering can amount to something I say or do. This helps discredit the picture of mental 
phenomena as essentially representations internal to the brain and sheds light on the mental 
as an ability whose manifestations can be as much in what we do as in what we think, but 
never in what our brain 'does' or 'thinks'. 
 I have shown elsewhere
27
 that Wittgenstein has influenced some current 
neuropsychological conceptions of memory, but the struggle is still uphill. Also, the notion of 
                                                 
27
 See Moyal-Sharrock (2009). 
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extended memory28 – for better or for worse – owes something to Wittgenstein, but it is in 
the conception of extensive memory proposed by Erik Myin and Karim Zahidi (2012)
29
 that I 
believe Wittgenstein is best present. Dissatisfied with the notion of extended memory 
because it remains grounded in an internalist and representational view of memory (that is, 
extended memory presupposes an internal memory to extend from), Myin and Zahidi 
introduced the notion of 'extensive memory', according to which remembering is 'a 
contextualized capacity' to make the past matter in current activities (2012, 115; Myin 
translation)
30
. Here, representations are eliminated, not accommodated. What is traditionally 
explained in terms of explicit representations is explained in terms of interactions. Memory is 
seen, not as a matter of storing and retrieving representations, but as a particular way of 
interacting with the environment (ibid., 126).  
 My own efforts in this field have focused on how Wittgenstein's work encourages us 
to stop treating automatic behaviour as behaviour that is (subconsciously) remembered. What 
neuropsychologists have called nondeclarative, procedural or implicit memory seems to me 
nothing but automatic or habitual ways of acting or speaking that are not reliant on memory, 
though of course, they can initially have been (as when a child first tries to tie her shoe laces 
and seeks to remember what she is supposed to do). So that so-called 'implicit memory' is no 
memory at all. There's another cognitive layer pared off by Wittgenstein's razor. 
 I presented my views on Wittgenstein and memory to neuropsychologists at the 
International Conference on Memory in York in 2011, and was delighted and relieved to see 
that my audience was not at all dismissive of the above. Interestingly, however, the main 
question put to me was: what, if not engrams – those 'transient or enduring change[s] in our 
brain that [result] from encoding an experience' (Shacter 1996, 58) – would 
neuropsychologists working on memory be left to work with? Well, that's an odd question, 
for no evidence has ever been found for the existence of engrams (the engram is a 
hypothetical entity); indeed, Fergus Craik had, in his inaugural plenary lecture, cautioned 
that: 'remembering is better thought of as an activity of mind and brain, akin to perceiving, 
and the 'search for the engram' is therefore doomed to failure'
31
. But there is also a positive 
answer here, and it is twofold: 1) Wittgenstein is not taking the brain away from 
                                                 
28
 According to which remembering involves interaction with an external element (e.g. amnesiac's notebook). 
This is an offshoot of the Extended Mind thesis: the thesis that cognitive processes and the individual itself can 
extend into the environment.  
29
 For discussions of extensive mind, see Hutto (2012) and Hutto & Myin (2013). 
30
 This is a radically situated model of memory according to which organisms simply embody their cognitive 
capacities, rather than derive these from internal description. (ibid. 126) 'The conception of memory  as 
embodied capacity which we have come to, departs from internalism from the very beginning. According to this 
conception, memory cannot be extended, because it never has been internal, but always extensive.' (ibid., 127). 
31
 It should be noted that Craik's stance was uncharacteristic. The talk was untitled 'Understanding memory: A 
processing view'. Here is the abstract: 'From a biological point of view, ‘memory’ is typically regarded as a 
structural aspect of the brain, reflecting the re-activation of memory traces laid down at the time of the initial 
experience. I will argue instead that remembering is better thought of as an activity of mind and brain, akin to 
perceiving, and that the ‘search for the engram’ is therefore doomed to failure. In my talk I will sketch the 
history of this idea and review current evidence from cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. I will 
discuss the implications of a processing viewpoint for such concepts as capacity, memory stores, memory 
systems and processing resources, and also examine the roles of context and the external environment in 
memory performance. I will illustrate these ideas with examples of my own and others from the general area of 
lifespan developmental changes in memory ability – both in children and in older adults.'  
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neuropsychologists; he is merely adjusting the target, what it is they should be (and should 
not be) looking for in the brain; 2) there is behaviour to work on. If, as Craig stresses, 
remembering is an activity – let's work on that. Which is not to say – as I hope to have made 
clear – that Wittgenstein is championing behaviourism.  
 Now, it might be objected, Wittgenstein can say what he likes; but where's the 
evidence? As Jesse Prinz quips, enactive and embodied approaches are easier to 'sell than to 
prove' (2009, 419). Well, it is scientists, not philosophers that base their claims on evidence. 
What philosophers do is work on more perspicuous conceptual presentations of how things 
are. And what Wittgenstein has done is show that we cannot make conceptual sense of basic 
certainties that start off as propositions, and engrams that work like people. But now let me 
return the question and ask scientists: where is your evidence? As Fergus Craik confirms, 
there is none. There has not been found anything resembling an engram, no shadow of 
anything representational or encoded in the brain, since Karl Lashley began his famous 
'search for the engram' in the 1920s. So why insist we go micro (or subpersonal) in our 
accounts of the mind when even science is unable to demonstrate that that's the way to go? If 
attention is to be paid by philosophy to science, shouldn't it be to scientific results rather than 
to scientific hypotheses that seem nourished by a preconception of how things should be?  
 Wittgenstein's enactive account of mindedness is informed by unassuming 
description, not tendentious explanation; it relies not on 'assumptions unguaranteed' and 
indeed unsubstantiated, but on what is 'already in plain view', and yet we seem 'not to 
understand' (PI 89). The burden of proof is therefore not on the philosopher – at least, not the 
Wittgensteinian philosopher – inasmuch as all she does is rearrange what 'lies open to view' 
(PI 126), what 'is always before [our] eyes' (PI 129) in an effort to give a more 'perspicuous 
presentation' of it – a 'new arrangement' which, as Wittgenstein hopes: 'might also give a new 
direction to scientific investigation' (RPP I, 950). Why then, when there are conceptually 
viable enactivist accounts of ourselves as mindful beings – and moreover nothing resembling 
or demanding a realization of the mental in the brain – should we persist in a search that is, 
as Craik puts it, doomed to failure?  
By applying Wittgenstein's Razor, we get the animal back into our understanding of 
the human mind. But as we labour to reawaken the animal in us, we should beware, 
conversely, of overly humanizing the non-human animal, lest animal concept-possession 
bounce back on us in the shape of propositions or content. As Hans-Johann Glock's paper in 
this issue shows, it needn't do; but it often does – at times, wittingly; at others, not. 
Moreover, we are not, with animals, out of the woods as it were: witness a recent article in 
the Scientific American, entitled: 'Do Plants Think?'
32
 It is in such moments of what Olli 
Lagerspetz calls 'misbegotten rationalism'
33
 that we gratefully look to Wittgenstein's razor-
sharp philosophy. 
 
 
                                                 
32
 June 2012 Scientific American Online Newsletter. 'Scientist Daniel Chamovitz unveils the surprising world of 
plants that see, feel, smell – and remember.'  
33
 'We may illegitimately attribute human traits to animals or we may, on the contrary, too easily assume that 
specifically human traits are reducible to biology. But there is also a third risk: that of misbegotten rationalism, 
blinding us to important features of life, both human and animal' (2012, 65). 
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